O rganizations depend on experts to oversee and execute complex tasks. When faced with pressures to reduce their dependence on experts, managers encounter a control paradox: they require experts to explicate the very knowledge and discretionary approaches that are the basis of their control for the purpose of undercutting this control. Experts rarely consent to such a situation; therefore, attempts to reduce dependence on experts and control their work are more often aspirational than actual. Drawing on an ethnography of an organization that was required by a government agency to transfer the work responsibilities of experts to employees throughout the organization, this paper describes how a network of actors developed a discursive, political process to renegotiate control of expert work practices. Through censure episodes, long-standing and largely successful expert practices were examined one by one and relabeled as problematic in relation to established goals. The constructed breaches opened expert practices to evaluation, questioning, and eventual delegitimation within the organization. This process depended on the introduction of new roles that revised dependencies and generated new resources. This paper contributes to the understanding of control in organizations by theorizing how the emergent, symbolic work of censure episodes are a means of gradually subverting expert control. Further, these struggles are reconceptualized as multiple-role negotiations rather than bilateral manager-expert struggles.
Introduction
Organizations employ experts with a mix of knowledge, experience, and intuition to interpret symbols, make decisions, and solve ambiguous problems in service of organizational goals. Managers depend on these expert employees to plan and execute their work. The work routines of experts-physicians, consultants, investment bankers, and marketing managers-are largely unscripted, unobserved, and unsupervised (Raelin 2011) . In these circumstances management "is not in a position to directly control or even manage knowledge-work processes" (Newell et al. 2009, p. 43) . Managers may stipulate expected outcomes (e.g., billable hours, profits, sales targets), but they often have only a notional sense of how experts produce the mandated outcomes (Alvesson 2004) .
This dependence on experts becomes a problem when organizations seek greater control over expert work. Examples from medicine , engineering (Leonardi and Bailey 2009) , and law (Brivot 2011) demonstrate renewed organizational interest in bureaucratizing professional and knowledge work, separating the conception of work from its execution. In capturing, articulating, and codifying expert work practices, organizations hope to standardize responses, remove discretion deemed unnecessary, and transfer the work to less skilled or less costly workers. This situation creates a paradox: to bureaucratize expert work, organizations depend on experts to explicate the very knowledge and discretionary approaches that are the basis of their control for the purpose of undercutting this control. Because of this paradox, organizational attempts to control professional and knowledge work are more often aspirational than actual (Morris 2001, p. 822; Swan and Scarborough 2001; Vallas 2006) .
Experts may ignore managerial commands (e.g., Kellogg 2009 ), and managerial attempts to develop countervailing resources, including incentives and sanctions, are rarely effective (Alvesson 2004, Morris and Empson 1998) . Organizations frequently settle for indirect control of experts via technology (Mazmanian et al. 2013) or monitoring and measurement systems (Sewell et al. 2012) . Or, more subtly, they may manage experts' dispositions (Hochschild 1983) , commitments (Michel 2011) , and interests (Dirsmith et al. 1997) . We have numerous examples of the seemingly intractable struggle between managers and experts (e.g., Barrett et al. 2012 , Brivot 2011 ), yet it remains unclear what alternative strategies exist: How can organizations wrest control from experts?
In this paper, I analyze a struggle between an organization and its experts over the control of experts' work and daily practices. I draw on ethnographic data collected in an organization that was required by a government agency to transfer the work of experts to employees throughout the organization. An inductive longitudinal analysis of how the organization eventually wrested control of some expert work practices, but not others, led to theoretical insights about the emergent, symbolic process through which multiple actors gradually undermined expert control. I introduce the concept of censure episodes to describe how uncertainties about expert practices were presented as organization-wide problems, labeled as breaches with organizational goals, and used to develop new bureaucratic practices. Through their accumulation, censure episodes eroded expert control. The concept of censure episodes is a useful transposition of the concept of degradation rituals. Degradation rituals are communicative processes through which public figures-politicians (Gephart 1978, Jacobsson and Löfmarck 2008) , executives (Benediktsson 2010 , Cavender et al. 2010 ), or celebrities (Adut 2004 )-are accused of rather spectacular breaches of community norms and values, resulting in the accused being stripped of their position and legitimacy (Adut 2005 , Garfinkel 1956 , Gephart 1978 . They are serious and often last-ditch efforts "needed and used only for the removal of relatively high status or otherwise influential members" (Trice and Beyer 1984, p. 660) . I reconstruct this concept to show how similar discursive, political dynamics can be mobilized in relation to accusations of minor, and sometimes mundane, breaches in daily practices. Accusations of trivial or small violations of norms and values, provided there are many, can be used as a vehicle to reduce the legitimacy of and set limits on the autonomy of experts.
I show how through a series of censure episodes a network of employees and managers develop a resistance effort that changes interpretations of expert practices and alters expert control. Through censure episodes, long-standing, mostly successful expert practices were examined one by one and consequently relabeled as problematic in relation to established goals. The reinterpretation of specific, taken-for-granted ways of working as breaches of known priorities called into question the value and legitimacy of expert work practices. Although censure episodes are inherently discursive processes in the sense that language is used both to represent organizational reality and to reorder it, I show how the episodes depended on particular roles, organizing tactics, and conditions. In doing so, I shift the analytical focus from power vested in resources to power vested in meanings and relational processes, and from bilateral struggles for control to multiple-role negotiations for control.
This analysis offers three main contributions to our understanding of organizational efforts to reconfigure power relations with experts for the purpose of increasing control over them. First, this paper demonstrates the efficacy of censure episodes, patterned communicative endeavors that transform the understanding and value of established expert practices, drawing on perceived, constructed flaws, as a means of subverting expert control. The censure efforts identified in this paper relate to relatively circumscribed and unspectacular breaches. However, it is through an accumulation of these breaches that power relations shift. The analysis demonstrates how, through questions-uncertainties and inconveniences-related to their practices experts may lose control of their work and that efforts to manage representations of their work practices in the organization are central to controlling their work. Second, this paper reconceptualizes struggles for control from dyadic manager-employee struggles and shows how a network of actors can collectively shift power relations. This network developed the resources to challenge established expert practices by developing knowledge of the social structure, diagnosing weaknesses in that structure, and using weaknesses-constructed or real-in these practices as opportunities for change. Third, transposition of the underlying dynamics of degradation rituals in my setting leads to new insights about the ways in which such dynamics can be enacted in relation to everyday practice. Isolated censure episodes may be of no consequence; however, when these seemingly small breaches accumulate, they are a means of challenging dominant actors.
Negotiating Control of Expert Work
Managerial attempts to wrest control of the labor processthe relations and activities that produce goods or services (Burawoy 1979, p. 15 )-from experts are not new. Early 20th-century master crafts-and tradesmen struggled to maintain control of their work. Adopting Frederick Taylor's efficiency techniques, managers attempted to separate the conception of the work from its execution (Braverman 1974 , Edwards 1979 . Like the experts of today, the crafts-and tradesmen possessed superior general and firm-specific knowledge and consequently exercised tight control over their work (Montgomery 1974) . However, firms did not require workers' consent and participation to shift control of their skilled labor processes from workers to the organization. It was relatively easy to monitor trade and craft work: simple observation processes combined with detailed analyses and the breakdown of tasks into small components by the efficiency men made it possible to separate the execution of the tasks from their conception. This separation eventually facilitated managerial control of the work and the deskilling of the craftsmen (Zuboff 1988) .
Contemporary expert work, often abstract and seemly intangible, is far less observable; thus, changes to this work are almost impossible without expert consent. As a result, managerial efforts to change expert work practices and routines are rarely deterministic, almost always negotiated, and often unsuccessful. Direct commands or the introduction of new procedures and technologies can be simply rejected or ignored (e.g., Currie et al. 2009 ). Even when changes have the potential to increase the efficacy of professional work practices or to reduce professionals' work hours, experts may ignore attempts to change their routines (Perlow and Porter 2009) . They may refuse to integrate new technologies into their work routines (Edmondson et al. 2001, Lapointe and Rivard 2006) or resist adapting their practices to comply with new policies (Kellogg 2009, Waring and ). Where changes are observed, the nature of the modifications and the pace of change are largely determined by the experts themselves (Barley 1986 , Levay and Waks 2009 , Orlikowski 1996 , through processes of collective learning (Feldman 2004) or collective action (Kellogg 2011) .
Experts strongly resist managerial efforts when changes leverage their experience and knowledge through less skilled workers or technology (Alvesson 2004) . Such changes reduce the organization's dependence on experts, deskilling and routinizing expert work. For example, knowledge management systems, often electronic repositories intended to capture and transfer experts' experiences and knowledge, are an explicit organizational attempt to capture and codify what experts know, separating the conception of the work from its execution. Under some circumstances, experts may cooperate with these change efforts, especially where a peer-to-peer approach circulates knowledge without threatening the control by experts (e.g., Hansen 1999) . These circumstances, however, require trust (Newell et al. 2001 ) and incentives (Hansen 1999) . Although experts may cooperate under some circumstances, organizations should not expect consent if experts are asked to forfeit an important source of power, their unique skills and knowledge (Empson 2001, Morris and Empson 1998) .
Most often, managers must settle for indirect or unobtrusive control over experts. Technology such as BlackBerry phones (Mazmanian et al. 2013) , email (Barley et al. 2011) , or surveillance equipment (Sewell 1998 ) may ensure that experts expend more effort and work longer hours in the organization's interest. Organizational control systems such as performance targets and reporting systems create conditions of "responsibilization" under which experts may direct their efforts to particular outcomes (Sewell et al. 2012 , Shamir 2008 , Silbey 2009 ). Alternatively, organizations attempt to control experts through the "iron fist of power in a velvet glove" (Jermier 1998, p. 236) , influencing their emotional displays (Martin et al. 1998 ) and commitments (Covaleski et al. 1998) .
Although these indirect forms of control guide the direction and intensity of experts' efforts, they do not reveal how experts use specialized knowledge and skills to solve organizational problems or permit the organization to interfere with or claim expert work practices. Furthermore, in these studies the overriding perspective is one of a duality-management versus employees. Conventional analyses of control and power relations portray binary encounters between managers, typecast as successfully exercising power, and employees, typecast as resisting their more powerful adversaries (cf. Fleming and Spicer 2008) . However, in relation to experts, the studies above suggest that managers find themselves, atypically, in a less powerful position than their formal subordinates and that managerial challenges, which draw on material forms of contestation-established organizational resources and routines (Morrill et al. 2003 )-such as hierarchical authority, rewards, and sanctions, are often ineffectual. As a consequence, organizations must find other ways to "shift the dynamics or openly challenge the givenness of situational power relations" Silbey 2003, p. 1331) and to renegotiate power relations from a relatively unfavorable stance vis-à-vis expert workers.
Rather than deploy the more conventional material resources that attach to formal hierarchy, challenges to expert control may depend on reinterpreting the situation with "attempt[s] to subvert dominant meanings, ideologies, and discourses" (Morrill et al. 2003, p. 394) . These efforts may be underutilized or simply difficult to detect and observe (Morrill et al. 2003) , especially in relation to experts. In this paper, I observe how a particular form of challenge rooted in reinterpreting established practices may be used to renegotiate power relations with experts. I describe a sequence of discursive tactics through which experts' practices are made explicit and constructed as breaches, real or alleged, of established expectations and goals. The censure episodes presented in this paper invert power relations by questioning the appropriateness of a set of practices and reinterpreting their underlying value, thereby delegitimizing the rights of the actor to perform them. In addition to devaluing long-standing ways of working, these episodes reinforce a particular social order and the accompanying values (Garfinkel 1956 ). In the process, "another socially validated motivational scheme," which differs "from that previously used to name and order the performances of the denounced" is validated (Garfinkel 1956, p. 422) . These episodes are symbolic forms of political action in that they attempt to subvert established orders. In the case presented here, analysis of the emergence of censure opportunities and the microprocesses of censure illuminate the multiple actors, organizing tactics, supporting resources, and conditions contributing to the erosion of expert control.
Methods
Using an inductive approach, I analyze longitudinal observations and real-time interviews to understand the struggle to wrest control of work responsibilities-in this case, the prescription and evaluation of compliance practices in laboratories-from experts. My setting is particularly useful for identifying the process, mechanisms, and conditions that facilitate the transfer of control of expert work because control over some work responsibilities was wrested from experts but control over other work responsibilities was not. By contrasting instances in which the transfer of control is negotiated with instances in which a negotiation does not occur, this analysis elucidates how the control of groups with established resources and dependencies may be eroded. This is an extreme case in the sense that there are numerous strong pressures from external and internal actors to transfer control of these work responsibilities as well as potentially severe consequences for the organization for failing to do so. Even so, the experts do not yield to this pressure, and the transfer of control occurs unevenly and requires significant effort. This case demonstrates the strength of expert control while identifying the local, situated factors that make this transfer possible. The emergent microprocesses of transferring control are the analytical focus of this paper.
Research Setting
This study was conducted at Eastern University (pseudonym), a major research university in the eastern United States with more than 500 laboratories. In 1999, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as part of a higher education initiative, inspected Eastern. Although the inspectors found no major violations, they were alarmed that members of the organization could not identify the infrastructure and procedures-roles, relations, and rules-used to manage compliance. It was not clear to the inspectors whether the compliant conditions they observed could be repeated or scaled, because the methods used-the actions, coordination, communication, and knowledge-were not articulated and codified. The inspectors concluded that Eastern lacked a sufficient compliance management system. The Management System. Eastern ultimately signed a consent decree according to which, in exchange for avoiding fines and public embarrassment over minor Specialists work with scientists to achieve compliance and operate autonomously from administrators.
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infractions, they agreed to create a management system. Although the EPA identified only environmental compliance issues, Eastern's administration decided to design a management system that would create an environment, health, and safety management system to fully incorporate all issues of health and safety. Management systems are promoted by the EPA as the most comprehensive means of governing compliance. Management systems simultaneously decentralize daily responsibility for compliance to employees throughout the organization and centralize the collection, analysis, and reporting of information about compliance practices and performance. These centralized informatics practices support standardized EPA auditing practices. At Eastern, the major change under the management system was the reassignment of compliance responsibility from centralized specialists to researchers working at the laboratory bench. Academic departments and their researchers became responsible for ensuring that their daily research practices complied with city, state, and federal regulations (Hoffman 1997, p. 185) . This shift in responsibility was to be facilitated by the creation of operating manuals, inspection checklists, enhanced training, and new organizational roles (described below). Overall, the decision to create a management system signaled a shift from using a professional logic for managing organizational compliance to using a bureaucratic logic, as summarized in Table 1 . Examples of this type of shift are found in healthcare (Ruef and Scott 1998, Waring and , law (Anleu 1992) , and accounting (Covaleski et al. 1998 ).
The Actors. This case involves four sets of actors: specialists, researchers, managers, and coordinators (see Table 2 for a summary). Centralized specialists had managed compliance in the laboratories at Eastern since the Second World War. Similar to other organizations that house hazardous materials, Eastern had delegated compliance responsibilities related to particular materials to three specialist groups: health physicists, overseeing the use, storage, and disposal of radioisotopes in laboratories; biosafety specialists, overseeing the purchase, use, and disposal of biological materials, pathogens, and toxins; and environment specialists, overseeing the use, storage, and disposal of chemicals. The specialists worked directly with the researchers, including principal investigators, postdocs, graduate and undergraduate students, lab managers, and lab technicians, to ensure that each laboratory complied with myriad federal, state, and local regulations. The specialists ensured that each lab had proper training, licenses, and equipment, and they inspected the labs as required. Training and advice were customized to each Relied on specialists to ensure they were in compliance.
Researchers responsible for compliance in laboratories.
Call on coordinators if they need help or information related to compliance and safety. Rely on coordinators to ensure they are in compliance.
Managers: Mid-level university administrators
Role did not exist.
• Specialists self-disciplined. Each specialist group provided administration with annual report of activities and performance.
Two managers appointed:
• EHS manager oversees specialists.
• MS manager oversees implementation of the MS.
Coordinators:
Administrative role in each department
Role did not exist. Generalist role created to assist researchers with their new compliance responsibilities. Responsible for laboratory compliance, including management of disposal, storage, and collection of waste; advisement of researchers on handling and containing materials; and inspection of labs monthly and annually.
lab and based on the experience and discretion of each specialist group. There was a direct line of communication between the researchers and the specialists. The individuals working in the specialist groups hold postgraduate degrees in their particular field and professional accreditation. Many of the specialists are active members of their professional community, participating in associations, contributing to public policy, teaching as adjunct faculty, or writing articles and books. Each group of specialists operated as an "enclave," working in loose connection to the administrative bureaucracy and self-managing in relation to professional standards and legal requirements (Abbott 1991) . At Eastern, the groups demonstrated their accountability in an annual report, presented to the provost, that outlined the achievement of regulatory compliance and their activities for the year. A historical analysis of Eastern's records shows that in the previous 50 years, no events, problems, or mistakes upset this arrangement (Wojtas 2005) .
Under the management system, responsibility for laboratory compliance was to shift to the researchers and their departments. Researchers would be held responsible for knowing not only what they individually needed to do to comply with regulations but also, more generally, what constituted compliant behavior and why. For example, a researcher may or may not use hazardous chemicals at her bench, but if other researchers in her lab did, she was required to know how to handle, store, and dispose of the chemicals. Furthermore, the EPA expected that on future inspections the researchers would be able to articulate the regulatory reasons for their practices. For example, researchers would be expected to know why chemical waste was stored in bins in fume hoods and whether other storage methods would be appropriate.
To assist the researchers and academic departments with their new responsibility for EHS compliance, a new position, coordinator, was created. Each academic department hired a coordinator, whose job was to oversee laboratory compliance within the department, ensuring that researchers integrated concern for safety and the environment into their research protocols and practices. Unlike the specialists, the coordinators did not have specialized knowledge or advanced degrees related to the various hazards (e.g., radioisotopes, biohazards, chemicals); they were hired because their experience demonstrated they could successfully work with labs and researchers. For example, the coordinator hired by the biology department had an associate's degree in biology and had most recently worked as a lab technician at a local research hospital, where one of her many duties was to represent her lab at health and safety meetings. This generalist role is found in most environmental management systems (Hoffman 1997) , in which the incumbent operates in an accountability function, ensuring that the organization is in compliance through training, inspections, and corrections.
Responsibility for three areas of compliance work was to be transferred from the specialists to the coordinators, who were to (1) oversee the disposal, storage, and collection of chemical, biological, and radioactive materials; (2) advise researchers on how to use chemical, biological, and radioactive materials; and (3) inspect the labs monthly and annually. The specialists were to continue to train the researchers and manage all licensing work. They would also continue to handle nonroutine responsibilities including responding to emergencies, advising on new situations and emerging materials, and setting up and moving labs. The specialists would work at arm's length from the labs to consult on unique and emerging risks.
To perform their jobs-advising on practices, inspecting labs, and correcting practices-coordinators would need to know what was regulated, how to evaluate the range of practices and circumstances found in labs, and what practices to prescribe. Specialists were expected to help coordinators learn to manage the majority of everyday compliance issues encountered in labs. Two new managerial positions were created to facilitate this shift. First, a management system MS manager was appointed. This person was responsible for the design and implementation of the system. Second, an environment health and safety EHS manager was appointed.
This person was responsible for directly overseeing the specialist groups and coordinating with the MS manager. I analyzed the actions and interactions of the specialists, researchers, coordinators, and managers to elucidate the struggle to transfer laboratory compliance oversight to the coordinators and researchers.
Ethnographic Data Collection
The use of ethnographic data collection methods allowed me to observe and trace, in real time, the experiences of the actors and their interactions. I began by observing the daily practices of specialists two months before the arrival of the coordinators to establish a baseline understanding of their practices. I spent another two months observing the daily interactions between the specialists and coordinators. I continued to follow these interactions, less intensely, for two years. For the first two months (May and June 2003), I focused on documenting the established work routines of the specialists. I spent five days a week shadowing specialists and observing the compliance work involving radiation (health physicists), biological agents (biosafety specialists), and chemicals (environmental specialists) and participating in the work of each group: collecting waste, organizing storage rooms, inspecting labs, and delivering supplies. I took detailed notes and typed these up at the end of each day. I also interviewed those doing the work and collected the documentation and record systems of each group.
For the next two years, my data collection focused on the struggle to transfer the control of compliance in laboratories from the specialists to the coordinators. In the first two months (July and August 2003), I spent five days a week observing interactions between the coordinators and specialists. Because the specialists were unwilling to involve the coordinators in compliance work or to share the related knowledge and practices, the interactions consisted primarily of the coordinators trying to clarify what was regulated, the nature of the regulations, and what constituted compliance in the laboratories. After this intense period of fieldwork, I returned to Eastern several days a month, for 22 months (September 2003 -June 2005 , to attend meetings, observe interactions in the lab, and follow up with specialists, coordinators, and managers about ongoing compliance issues. I conducted 61 semistructured interviews (audio recorded) with specialists, coordinators, and managers and noted another 95 informal conversations about the work and management system. In addition, I collected all documents related to the management system, including the numerous drafts of standard operating procedures (SOPs), inspection checklists, and inspection guidelines.
Analysis of the Partial Transfer of Laboratory
Compliance Oversight to the Coordinators While in the field, I observed that the coordinators began to oversee some compliance work and that with time this list of work began to grow. However, the list was idiosyncratic: it lacked some core responsibilities and included others that were relatively tangential to the overseeing of laboratory compliance. I was interested in how responsibilities were transferred and why some were transferred but not others. I took an inductive approach to understanding this. I read through my data and recorded observations and questions in memos related to these transferred responsibilities. I coded the data line by line, and as I did this, I began to note that each of the transferred responsibilities could be traced back to a compliance question, sometimes quite a simple question, posed by a lab researcher. This made sense, as the coordinators did not know where to start in the labs or how to proceed. I also noticed that a number of questions researchers raised did not lead to a transfer of compliance oversight in laboratories. I decided to use these compliance questions and their trajectories as my unit of analysis in order to understand how it was that some questions led to a transfer of control of related responsibilities whereas others did not.
I identified 36 unique questions about laboratory compliance raised by researchers. These are listed in the first column of Table 3 . To trace the trajectories of these questions, I coded for any reference to the subjects of these 36 questions in my data, including all field notes, interviews, conversations, and documentation. Based on this analysis, I extracted the dialogues, observations, and talk related to a question to construct a composite narrative for each question (Langley 1999) . I did this in order to bring together my observations and "the fragments of stories, bits and pieces told here and there, to varying audiences" (Boje 2001, p. 5) . This provided the basis for analyzing the emergence, evolution, and trajectory of these questions over time and the related interactions and roles of the researchers, specialists, coordinators, and managers in each question's trajectory.
I next sought to understand the content and dynamic of these interactions and to identify any patterns in the nature of the questions raised, the trajectory of interaction and dialogue around these questions, and the types of work transferred. Using a line-by-line coding approach, I generated first-order codes inductively from the narratives (Charmaz 2006) . In addition to performing detailed coding of the ongoing interactions surrounding each question, I coded many other factors related to the question and interactions, including the nature of work related to the question, the specialist group responsible, the way specialists did this work, the source of the question, and the temporal ordering of the questions.
Drawing on these codes, I used analytic induction (Becker 1998 , Ragin 1987 to build a conceptual process model (see Table 4 ) of how some questions led to the transfer of laboratory compliance work from the specialists to the coordinators whereas other questions did not upset the status quo arrangements. Analytic induction is a particularly effective method for theorizing social processes because it proceeds through constant comparison of cases in which a particular outcome of interest is observed (e.g., transfer of control) and cases in which it is not (e.g., transfer of control is foreclosed) (Katz 2001) . The analysis proceeded narrative by narrative, beginning with a question narrative that led to the transfer of the specialists' work. I conducted an inventory of which compliance responsibilities the specialists continued to control and which had been transferred to the coordinators. This inventory was reviewed and confirmed by a manager, a specialist, and a coordinator.
Using Excel to track all the codes attached to this account, I examined the temporal order and frequency of the codes and the relationships between them to develop a rough theory of how this transfer happened. I then modified the theory through an analysis of each narrative, first comparing and contrasting the narratives in which control was transferred and then drawing on the narratives in which it was not. Contradictory dataquestion narratives that did not involve the transfer of compliance oversight to the coordinators-were crucial in this process because they challenged the emerging process model and required its continuous refinement. For example, when it appeared that two narratives had similar trajectories but resulted in different outcomes, I returned to the data linked to each of the codes, compared these, and, where necessary, generated more-refined codes.
This iterative process of comparing and contrasting narratives and of refining the process model continued until I was able to identify conceptual categories of codes. Using these categories I examined how question narratives in which the coordinators learned to manage compliance in labs differed from question narratives in which the specialists maintained control of their responsibilities. Forty-five first-order codes facilitated distinctions across the narratives. These first-order codes were bundled into nine conceptual categories and then into four phases that together transferred compliance oversight from the specialists to the coordinators. The tables in the appendix present the 36 questions (ordered by resolution and then breach), the coding of their trajectory through the four phases and nine conceptual categories (columns 6-9 in Table A .2), and the resolution of each (column 11 in Table A. 3).
Although the model was developed iteratively, I report only the final model composed of four phases (identify, transform, construct, and criticize) and two question trajectories (censure successful and censure dropped). To complement this inductive analysis, I conducted two additional analyses. First, I considered various factors that may have provided less socially and politically complex reasons for why some compliance responsibilities were transferred. For example, Table A .1 in the appendix indicates which department raised the question: Was it a powerful department or several influential labs that led to Censure dropped: local problem only. Question not pursued. the erosion of the specialists' control (column 2)? Which specialist group was responsible for the group: were some specialist groups more vulnerable than others (column 3)? What type of compliance work was questioned: were some types of compliance work more likely to be transferred (column 4)? How did the specialists control the work: were some ways of working more permeable than others (column 5)? I describe the relationship between these factors and the two trajectories as well as the nature of the breaches constructed around the specialists' practices (see column 10) below. Second, I analyzed the question narratives using organizational role (researcher, coordinator, manager, and specialist) as my unit of analysis. The development of the process model focused intensely on the nature of the interactions that upended the specialists' entrenched control of compliance oversight in laboratories. Throughout this analysis it became apparent that the interactions in each phase were initiated and resourced by individuals inhabiting specific organizational roles. This analysis provides insight into the roles, related resources, and pressures that initiate, sustain, and link the four phases of action.
Attempts to Transfer Control
The specialists, under the managers' direction, developed the supporting material and tools for the EHS management system. They served on committees that created, for example, an inspection program, a management system manual, and a training system. The managers intended for these tools, repositories of compliance expectations, prescriptions, rationales, and correctives, to enable the coordinators and researchers to oversee compliance in the laboratories, independent of the specialists. The EPA approved the design and the supporting components, confirming that the inspection program was ready, the training system was online, the manuals were on shelves, and the departmental coordinators were working. Researchers knew to contact the coordinators for advice about compliance issues, and the coordinators could consult the management system documentation to answer researchers' questions. In extreme or special circumstances, the coordinators would consult the specialists. Eastern could demonstrate to the EPA that it had developed the organizational infrastructure and supporting tools that make up a management system. However, the researchers and coordinators were not able to evaluate and prescribe compliance practices independent of the specialists. Despite all the printed text and online documentation, the specialists had not articulated the detailed expectations, prescriptions, rationales, and correctives that the coordinators needed. The managers, although they repeatedly told the specialists to work with the coordinators to transfer compliance oversight in labs, had no effect on the specialists. An important example of this was the inspection checklist. This document contained more than 50 inspection questions that coordinators were to consult when they conducted their monthly laboratory inspections. The checklist was, in one coordinator's words, "cryptic." The instructions were either too ambiguous, assuming the reader had sufficient experience to interpret general statements, or too technical, assuming the reader had the specialized training needed to decipher and interpret the information. The activities necessary to achieve compliance were not explicated, and regulatory requirements were not made explicit. The coordinators did not know how to assess a situation to determine whether current practices were compliant, and they did not know what solutions to prescribe to researchers.
The specialists did not actively resist (Iedema et al. 2004 ) the change effort. Instead, they ambiguously accommodated (Prasad and Prasad 1998 ) the managers throughout this process. They did not feel threatened by the change, for several reasons. First, they had, over the years, experienced many fleeting university-wide change initiatives and had learned, as one specialist explained, to "ignore it until it goes away." They had lived through zero-based budgeting, reengineering, and other fads. This was one more time when "we just need to duck," laughed another specialist. Second, most of the specialists could not imagine the coordinators knowing how to inspect a lab or how to discuss compliance solutions with researchers. A biosafety specialist was incredulous: "Do you think they [the coordinators] will ever be able to do my job"? They found it difficult to imagine how their expertise and experience would be replaced (Ferguson and Hasan 2013) . Third, they had never been affected by bureaucratic authority within the university and did not expect this to change. They did not expect that anyone was "going to make us [the specialists] follow through on this."
Both the researchers and the coordinators were frustrated that the management system transferred responsibility for compliance but not the supporting capabilities. The researchers were bothered by the management system primarily because it imposed an additional, significant responsibility. The department chairs encouraged the researchers to rely on their coordinators to manage interactions with the various specialist groups and to oversee issues in the labs. At the same time, the coordinators were in a difficult situation. They were under pressure to support the laboratories but did not know how to advise them. A coordinator explained, "We are flying by the seat of our pants, trying to inspect labs and ensure compliant practices. The scientists [researchers] want a consultation on what they should be doing and we just don't know." The coordinators, working separately in their departments, tried to engage the specialists in teaching them compliance, but the specialists refused. A specialist explained the situation: "My job is not to teach them [the coordinators] my job. I have two degrees and 12 years of experience. No way." When called by the coordinators, the specialists would go to the lab to advise researchers, but they would not teach the coordinators how to advise researchers.
Organizations often fail to fully implement planned changes (Kotter 1996, Meaney and Pung 2008) . The specialists' ability to resist and obstruct interference in their domain of work confirms the observed difficulty of managing employees who exclusively control the knowhow and know-what of their work (e.g., Alvesson 2004, Waring and ). Even when regulators require organizations to change, "real change" may not materialize (Barnes and Burke 2006, Kellogg 2011) . Organizations may agree to implement formal programs in order to signal compliance to the regulator but then decouple these formal programs from their daily operations (Edelman 1992, Meyer and Rowan 1977) . Alternatively, organizations such as Eastern may commit to implementing the change but fail to do so because of indifference or resistance (Kellogg 2009 ). The theoretically interesting story at Eastern begins after the specialists demonstrate their capacity to impede the transfer of compliance oversight intended by the regulators.
Emergent Attempts to Transfer Control
Eventually, the coordinators, managers, and researchers made headway into the specialists' domain and transferred control of some compliance responsibilities to the coordinators. They accomplished this through what I call censure episodes in which these actors surfaced, illustrated, and then argued that foundational features of the specialists' work practices contradicted the management system's goals. Although censure processes hinge on judgments about the appropriateness and value of a set of actions, they did not begin as symbolic struggles over the meaning of actions but instead emerged from extended frustrated attempts to collaborate with the specialists.
At Eastern, each censure episode depended on the reinterpretation and delegitimization of the specialists' established work practices in relation to the management system's goals. Regulatory compliance had always been an organizational goal; however, the adoption of a management system added new, specific dimensions to this goal. Eastern had agreed to produce compliance through standardized, transparent, distributed procedures that the EPA could easily audit. The expectation was that Eastern would develop a common set of written procedures that made compliance requirements and rationales transparent to researchers and that could be operationalized in a research setting. The coordinators and managers argued that the specialists' practices contravened all these goals.
The four phases of a censure episode are detailed in Table 4 . In the hallways, at their lab benches, and in meetings, the researchers questioned and complained about the specialists' advice and requirements. The 36 questions raised in the first phase were potential material the coordinators could use in the second phase. In the second phase the coordinators determined whether a particular question was a pervasive organizational issue and whether it stemmed from the specialists' advice and practice. In the third phase, after learning more about compliance practices related to the questions, the coordinators evaluated whether these ways of working violated the management system's goals. They shared these violations with managers, who, in the fourth phase, used them to criticize and require change to particular areas of the specialists' advice and practice. The managers insisted that the specialists transform their advice and practices so as to eliminate the identified breach. The specialists standardized and codified their advice, rendering the technical and legal rationales transparent, and incrementally transferred compliance oversight to the coordinators.
Censure Successful I draw on the vignette of hazardous waste disposal (question 1 in Table 3 ) to illustrate, in depth, one successful censure episode. This vignette was selected because it demonstrates that the specialists resisted the transfer of control of compliance oversight even when there was little at stake. Hazardous waste management was a peripheral Investigate alternative means of achieving compliance.
Identify the source of the problem as the means and rationales of specialists.
Transform a problem into a breach or a violation of organization's goals.
Share the breach with managers.
Present identified value breach to specialists and communicate organizational goals.
Specialists defend the practices, explicating rationales and principles underlying their advice.
Criticize specific specialist practices in terms of those goals.
Phase triggered by
Researchers' responsibility for compliance in laboratories.
Specialists' failure to clarify advice or placate researchers.
Coordinators' finding that local problem is found across numerous laboratories.
Managers informed about particular specialists' practice as a value breach.
Phase contributes to censure by
Gathering pressing compliance issues from operational surface of organization.
Demonstrating scale of particular compliance issues.
Articulating specialists' practices as generating organization-wide contradictions with goals.
Leveraging hierarchical authority to make particular demands for change.
responsibility, evidenced by the fact that the specialists employed a dedicated contractor to monitor and collect hazardous waste, and yet the specialists were unwilling to articulate a definition of hazardous waste that was accessible and useful to the coordinators and researchers. I provide an extensive account, generated from field notes, interviews, inspection documentation, and SOPs, to illustrate the rich and protracted dynamics observed as responsibility for this work is transferred from the specialists to the coordinators. I also draw on other examples from Table 3 to enrich the description of the nature, roles, and consequence of the breaches.
Phase 1: Identify Local Issue. Each episode stemmed from a researcher's question about the specialists' compliance advice or practices. The researchers raised questions because they were confused about or annoyed with the specialists' compliance prescriptions. They raised the questions directly with the specialists when they were in the labs. These questions had circulated in labs for years, but now that the researchers were technically responsible for compliance, the questions began to circulate beyond local gatherings. A question about the definition of hazardous waste led to the criticism of the specialists' practice of providing customized, verbal advice to labs on this issue. This question led to the creation of a list of wastes to be treated as hazardous. This list allowed coordinators to take responsibility for advising on and inspecting hazardous waste. Furthermore, the specialists were no longer able to decide, lab by lab, what constituted hazardous waste.
The episode began in a laboratory. A month into his job, the coordinator in the medical research department received an angry call from a researcher requesting immediate clarification of what constituted hazardous waste. Earlier in the day I had assisted a contractor who collected hazardous waste from this laboratory. The contractor refused to remove a bottle of waste containing a low percentage of tetrodotoxin, a potent biological material. He explained to the researcher at the bench that he could not remove the waste for disposal because it contained this biological content. The researcher expressed frustration toward the contractor:
The specialists never tell us what you can and can't pick up. Why not chemicals mixed with tetrodotoxin? Is there a specific series of actions we need to go through to deactivate the agent? From my perspective it is no longer dangerous. The concentration is low and it has been diluted for so long. We want to follow the (hazardous waste disposal) rules. We just need to know what to do.
The researcher called the coordinator because he wanted an explanation of which materials could be placed in the hazardous waste bin and which materials required other methods of disposal.
The coordinator could not provide an answer. Although responsible for inspecting each laboratory's hazardous waste disposal practices, the only information this coordinator had was a monthly laboratory inspection checklist, written by the specialists as part of the management system documentation. Reviewing the checklist, the coordinator found the question "Is all hazardous waste properly stored within a marked satellite accumulation area?" and asked, "How are we supposed to know what this means?" The coordinator did not know which materials fell into the category of hazardous waste or how to determine whether these materials were stored "properly." His call to the specialists did not clear up the situation. The specialist offered to visit the lab and provide a consultation. Dissatisfied with the specialist's consultation, the researcher contacted the coordinator again, triggering Phase 2.
Phase 2: Transform Local Issue into Organizational Problem. When the specialists' responses failed to satisfy the researchers, the coordinators used these local, unanswered questions to investigate specialists' practices. They made a list of the problems raised by researchers and used a collective process to learn more. By talking with researchers and observing labs, they identified which questions were isolated to one or two labs and which questions affected multiple labs. When a question was found to be a problem across labs and departments, it became an organizational problem to resolve. The coordinators investigated it further as a group and in isolation from the specialists.
In the case of hazardous waste determination, the coordinator brought the local issue of the disposal of tetrodotoxin to the other coordinators, asking if they had a similar issue in their labs. The coordinators found that among the researchers there was a variety of understandings about what could and should be placed in the hazardous waste bins. Like the researcher in the biology lab discarding tetrodotoxin, many did not perceive such waste to be toxic and thought it could be placed in the hazardous waste bins. They also observed different practices for mixing separate classes of waste and disposing of ethidium bromide, another toxic material.
The coordinators tried to understand why there were so many different disposal practices across the labs. In particular, they wanted to know whether the source of organizational problems related to the specialists' advice. They learned what advice the specialists gave labs and why they prescribed the advice they did. This often involved interacting directly with the specialists. In the case of the hazardous waste episode, the coordinator invited two specialists to a department lab meeting to explain themselves. A specialist distributed a list of materials the EPA considered hazardous and which therefore must be placed in the satellite accumulation area (hazardous waste bin) for pickup. The list did not include toxins (e.g., ethidium bromide), and it did not mention exceptions (select agents such as tetrodotoxin), 1 as noted in the following dialog:
Researcher, reviewing the list: I don't see ethidium bromide on this list.
Specialist 1: That's because the EPA does not consider it to be hazardous waste, but we do ask you to collect it as a hazardous waste.
Specialist 4: Just because something is not hazardous waste doesn't mean it's not hazardous. If you're unsure about anything, call us first before placing it in the satellite accumulation area [hazardous waste bin].
The specialists acknowledged that the EPA's hazardous waste list is incomplete and that researchers should include waste beyond this list. But they did not explain the distinctions between hazardous, toxic, and select agents. They also did not offer a new, useful list of wastes to be placed in "hazardous waste" bins. Instead, they requested that the researchers call them about anything that is not on the EPA's list. This interaction demonstrates the specialists' desire to provide advice customized to each lab and their refusal to reveal relatively basic information about hazardous waste.
Phase 3: Construct a Breach. The coordinator recounted this experience to the other coordinators. They investigated how the specialists determined what constituted hazardous waste. They questioned the technician contracted by the specialists to empty the bins. They searched the Web and called colleagues in other organizations. They learned more about the materials and practices used in labs (chemicals, toxins, select agents), compliance terminology (class of waste), and the major issues surrounding hazardous waste disposal (containing, labeling). They found that it was not difficult to define hazardous waste and to create a standardized, codified approach. The specialists' wish to customize and consult with each lab separately on hazardous waste was not necessary and was at odds with the new management system. Furthermore, it created numerous, potentially negative consequences that the coordinators described to the managers.
Drawing on these findings, the coordinators constructed breaches between the specialists' methods and the organization's goals by describing how the specialists' ways of working endangered several specific goals. In doing so, the coordinators articulated and repeated several new and emerging goals, including standardized, codified, transparent rules. They invited the managers to their weekly meeting to present the breach. A coordinator summarized the hazardous waste situation for the managers:
Coordinator 3: Over the preceding weeks and months, we've arrived at the need for a common understanding there cannot be inconsistencies across labs. Yet, when we talked with researchers we found a huge range of practices.
Coordinator 1: The researchers want the specifics, the nuts and bolts of what to do. Why can't this be written down explicitly?
Coordinator 3: The specialists came to our department meeting and there was so much ambiguity about when something was hazardous waste, concentration percentage in a bottle and when you fill a bottle and call for pickup, what do you do in the meantime. There was so much ambiguity.
In this meeting the coordinators repeatedly identified the organizational problem to be the "huge range of practices" in the labs, the ambiguity of advice, and the lack of specific advice (nuts and bolts). They emphasized the researchers' need for specific, clear, standardized advice, leveraging their status to draw the managers' attention to the issue. As the meeting continued, the coordinators discussed how the specialists' approach to compliance conflicted with new, emerging compliance priorities.
Coordinator 1: Yes, I want answers to my questions on waste.
MS Manager: It sounds like we need a workshop on waste. I'll send an email to the specialists.
Coordinator 2: I think we need standard operating procedures, for a lot of things. Even things like safety glasses, it should be specified whether you have to wear glasses in the lab if you're not involved in the experiment.
Coordinator 3: But I am concerned about the SAAs [hazardous waste bins] because that is what EPA cares about and there is supposed to be a protocol for all labs. I am trying to understand what kinds of things are violations but the only way I know about these things is through talking with the specialists.
MS Manager: Okay, yes this is a problem. It needs to be other than just word of mouth.
Coordinator 3 identified the specialists' mode of operating-through verbal advice customized to each lab-and explained how difficult it is to identify compliance violations without the specialists' support. She invoked the EPA, reminding the managers that the disposal of hazardous waste (technically a simple task) is a specific concern, and that according to the bureaucratic principles of the management system, Eastern is expected to standardize and codify procedures across all the laboratories. The coordinators argued for a standardized, written form of advice and pointed out goals that the specialists' current practices violate. The manager agreed that the specialists' current practice is a problem.
Phase 4: Criticize Expert Practice. The managers responded to the breaches between the specialists' ways of working and the organization's goals by criticizing the specialists' practices. Because of their hierarchical authority, the managers could call a meeting and require that specialists attend, but their formal authority did not equip them with the technical terms and information about compliance practices needed to form critiques. The constructed breaches, because of their grounding in the particular, allowed managers to present an extensive, detailed critique of a specific circumstance and then connect it to a general critique of the way the specialists handled their responsibilities. This would not have been possible without the researchers' and coordinators' actions in Phases 1-3.
In the case of hazardous waste, the managers used what they learned from the coordinators to challenge the specialists on specific actions and decisions. A detailed, lengthy conversation, rooted in issues of technical and legal compliance, began with a pointed question for the specialists:
MS Manager: When the coordinators go through the labs, they have to make sure that all hazardous waste is kept in satellite accumulation areas. it means to be compliant as a university we have to be as consistent and transparent as possible. This is the idea of the system [EHS management system]. Going forward, the answers to these compliance questions don't come solely from people in this room.
EHS Manager: Yes, we need you to develop a standard operating procedure for managing hazardous waste. We need you to explain to researchers and coordinators what they need to do.
The specialist described their desired approach of providing advice lab by lab and exercising contingent ("it depends") judgment. The manager argued that confusion stemming from this approach may violate the goals of consistency and transparency embedded in the management system. The EPA wanted the university to be transparent and consistent in managing compliance. The second manager specified a solution aligned with these goals, a SOP that defines hazardous waste and explains how to dispose of it.
The manager also pointed out that the lack of clarity about these definitions can result in a violation. He elaborated on this point, demonstrating his awareness that concentration might be important, and indicated that he thought mistakes were being made in labs because of the lack of clarity about this issue:
Specialist 2: Why are they requesting this? What more do they want?
MS Manager: They need to know your approach on these things.
Specialist 2: They already have the MSDS [material safety data sheet] and the information we have posted on the website. What else do they want?
MS Manager: They want you to take those materials and roll your experience into it.
Specialist 3: We can't do that. We need exact questions. Specifically, what do they want to know? Specialist 3 persistently defended the need to know the contextual details of a situation. Throughout the meeting, the specialists confirmed that they want to customize their advice lab by lab rather than lay out their rationales. This vigorous defense throughout emphasizes the breach between their ways of working and the management system deemed more likely by the EPA to produce compliance through standardized, codified advice. At the end of the meeting, the EHS manager asked the specialists to draft a document. He specified the document's narrow content, hazardous waste, and told the specialists to stop distinguishing between the legal and technical definitions of hazard and to instead pragmatically specify what should be placed in the hazardous waste bins.
As a consequence of this censure episode-identifying a local issue, transforming a local issue into an organizational problem, constructing a breach, and criticizing specialists' practices-the specialists were required to articulate, standardize, and codify their advice, in relation to a particular breach only. The specialists were told to write a SOP, and this activity was closely monitored by the coordinators and managers until completion. The hazardous waste SOP, for example, began as a short, dense, technical document, impenetrable to anyone other than a specialist, and was rewritten numerous times in response to the coordinators' ongoing breach critiques and the managers' demands.
The specialists altered their definition of "hazardous" to include materials such as ethidium bromide and tetrodotoxin: "Hazardous waste includes materials destined for disposal that possess hazardous characteristics (i.e., toxic, ignitable, corrosive or reactive), or substances that are listed as hazardous waste by the EPA or DEP [Department of Environmental Protection]" (from university SOP). They also included six lists that named all materials to be placed in the hazardous waste bins. In addition to the SOP, the managers decided that it was necessary to have written guidance or advice related to the inspection question. This document was also revised iteratively with feedback from the coordinators. So, for example, a three-page "guidance" document was written to help the coordinators inspecting laboratories answer the question, "Is all hazardous waste properly stored within a marked satellite accumulation area?" The document broke the question down into the multiple legal and technical issues it comprised (e.g., labeling, secondary containment, class of waste, capping of bottles). One paragraph addressed the issue of labeling the hazardous waste bin:
Eastern requires that the pale green sticker be used at each waste collection area. It is approximately 4 by 6 and should be applied to the secondary containment [waste bin] or in the immediate area where they are kept. Other signs are not acceptable. EPA requires that areas be posted to designate the area, but does not specify the exact signage. Eastern has chosen to standardize the signs wherever possible by the use of the green sticker.
In this paragraph the specialists articulate a labeling requirement in detail and specify which aspects of this procedure are EPA requirements and which are local requirements. The local requirements were negotiated among the specialists, coordinators, and managers.
The Breaches and Their Consequences
The coordinators constructed breaches for 23 of the 36 questions. Three categories of breaches emerged. First, the coordinators objected to the specialists' practice of prescribing customized advice to each laboratory. Second, the coordinators objected to the specialists' practice of prescribing overly prudent advice that exceeded regulatory requirements. Third, the coordinators objected to the opacity of the specialists' advice and to the specialists' refusal to explain their diagnostic rationales.
The breach between the specialists' customized advice and goal of having standardized policies was most common, occurring in 13 of the 23 censure episodes and cutting across issues as diverse as disposal (question 4) and licensing (question 14). This breach was identified in the case of the hazardous waste issue (presented above) and what could be poured down the drain (question 3; see Table 5 for a summary). The specialists' practice of providing advice tailored to each lab was represented as problematic because it confused researchers as they moved into new lab spaces or discussed the procedures in department meetings and because it contradicted the management system's goal of having a uniform set of compliance procedures.
A second type of breach, observed in the case of the laboratory doors (question 16 in Table 6 ), was the claim that the specialists' practice of giving overly prudent advice that exceeded the letter of the law violated the goals of transparent and implementable procedures. This occurred in six cases, including issues related to lab Researcher: "Can you put this [advice] up on the Web? Right now, the website says that only soap and water can go down the drain." Specialist 1: "You should call us with questions." Coordinator 4: "All acids can go down the drain?" Specialist 1: "All inorganic acids." Researcher: "So I can pour [names harsh acid] down the drain without neutralizing it?" Specialist 4: "Well, actually it depends whether your lab is connected to the neutralization tank."
Transform
The coordinators learn about treatment technology under sinks or in the basement.
Coordinators canvassed their labs to find out what researchers are pouring down the drain. They learn that there are a range of practices and that researchers believe that there are technical fixes built into the plumbing system.
Coordinator 5: "You can't dump perfusion fluids down the drain. The researchers believed there was a 'magical' purification tank in the basement. There is a great misconception about this "
They discuss how to treat perfusion fluids with bleach and whether this can be poured down the drain in buildings with acid neutralization tanks.
Construct
The coordinators show customized advice has the potential to create confusion.
Coordinator 5: "You can't assume that every building has a neutralization tank." He lists the buildings that do. EHS Manager: "So we really need an SOP on this."
Coordinator 6: "There is a ready opportunity for confusion, because there are areas where there are special treatment facilities. The manager summed up this meeting, saying, "When you put the advice beside each other-which the coordinators did-they do not seem congruent "
Criticize
The manager points out that customized advice affects compliance. 
Compliance oversight transferred
After almost 20 iterations, a list of substances is identified. The specialists develop an 8 × 11 inch sticker that lists 11 categories of substances that can be poured down the drain. All other liquids must be bottled and picked up by a waste vendor for disposal. This sticker is placed above the sinks in 500 labs across the university.
setup (question 17) and chemical cleanup (question 19).
Researchers struggled to consistently implement advice that was technically and legally conservative. The coordinators argued that the specialists had not been transparent about what was legally required and that the goal of the management system was not to impede scientific productivity but to seamlessly integrate compliance into scientific practice. Furthermore, overly conservative compliance practices made compliance more difficult and, possibly, less likely. A third type of breach, observed in the case of a noxious odor (question 22 in Table 7 ), was the opacity of the specialists' response to compliance issues. Like most professionals, the specialists did not reveal their inference procedures, how they moved from diagnosing a situation to prescribing a treatment. This breach was identified in relation to four questions, including episode 23, in which the coordinators learned that the specialists could describe a step-by-step process for diagnosing mold issues, revealing and transferring the administration and communication of the process to the coordinators. According to the coordinators, the specialists' opaque, private process did not create the transparency required by a distributed compliance system. None of the constructed breaches counted as breaches in the life world of the specialists. The provision of customized, contingent, verbal advice is a trademark of professional work (Abbott 1988) . Professionals work in relation to "cases" to provide the most appropriate diagnosis and treatment. The specialists did not see why their contingent advice regarding pouring materials down the drain was so scandalous (see Table 5 ). The provision of conservative or overly prudent advice that may inconvenience the client is not a problem for professionals. In the case of the lab doors (see Table 6 ), the specialists explained that there was no requirement that the doors be closed at all times; instead, they required it based on their professional judgment. Professionals expect that a client will adjust his or her behavior and overcome related barriers to comply with professional advice (Abbott 1991) . Finally, the idea that a professional will encounter a case in which a process of deduction must be used to diagnose a situation (see Table 7 ) is not an indication of failure or confusion as far as the professionals are concerned. The Table 6 Example of Censure Episode with Overly Prudent Advice Breach Question 16. Why do the lab doors need to be closed when particular biological materials are present? Specialists' advice: Laboratories using biological material that the specialists classified, drawing on NIH (National Institutes of Health) and CDC (Centers for Disease Control) guidelines, as biosafety level 2 were to keep their laboratory doors closed at all times to contain these materials.
Identify:
Researchers find the requirement to be onerous and potentially dangerous.
Researcher: "Why do we have to keep our lab door closed? Is there an alternative way to comply?" Specialist 9: "You need to shut lab doors at all times if it is a [medium-risk] lab If you have concerns about this let me know. "
Researcher: "I think it's more dangerous in our lab to keep the door shut. We have people coming in and out with chemicals all the time. If you have to keep opening the door with chemicals in your hands, there's more chance of a spill."
Transform:
The coordinators observe the problem raised by researchers and learn that the policy is not a legal requirement.
Coordinator 3: "I stood there and watched for about ten minutes the first day we made them keep their doors closed. Between 20 and 30 people were going back and forth between the lab rooms and they had to open and close doors every time. Overall they complied, but there were lots of problems. The door handles were being contaminated and so they started keeping paper towels or boxes of tissues near their doors so that people could use them on the handles." Coordinator 2: "We need to decide what is rational to do. What is sustainable to do? We need to find what is workable for everyone."
Coordinator 3: "I did some research on the regulations for biohazards. I tried to figure out what the building code has to say about laboratory doors being closed You know our signs, the signs that say the doors have to be closed, that is not a (legal) requirement. That is a (university) guideline "
Construct:
Coordinators portray the advice as counter to the organizational goal of biological containment.
Coordinator 3: "[The specialists say] the lab doors must be kept shut. It isn't easy to do this and that when you do this it creates other problems lab members touch the door handles with contaminated gloves. Also, everyone has to be careful about hitting others with the swinging doors. We (coordinators) are working on figuring out if this is necessary." Coordinator 4 describes the practical difficulties involved in keeping the doors closed, summarizing the problem by saying, "We'll either have to change a lot of doors, or the requirement."
MS Manager: "This is bothering researchers. We will look into this and get back to you."
Criticize:
Managers demand a transparent policy. Specialists defend their policy.
Specialist 8: "The coordinators came and said where is the law? There is no law about this It is a policy we created based on our professional judgment " MS Manager: "We are not going to be making [compliance] decisions in a vacuum anymore The idea is to do this in a systematic way but also in a way that makes sense." Specialist 7: "Yes, but different types of biological materials present different types of problems."
Compliance oversight transferred
The specialists wrote an SOP on the issue and in the procedure specified that only [a few high-risk] labs had to keep their doors continuously closed. In addition the SOP, the episode resulted in the removal of every sign at the university that read "Door must be closed."
specialists did not interpret their behavior as problematic. They freely admitted that they provided advice lab by lab, that their advice was prudent, and that they often used a deductive approach. Furthermore, none of the "breaches" constructed by the coordinators had threatened organizational compliance in the past. Eastern was regularly audited by various local, state, and federal agencies, and noncompliance was not an issue. Even the EPA audit did not identify noncompliance as an issue. The issue for the EPA was the lack of a comprehensive, bureaucratic system for monitoring compliance. The organization had depended on the specialists for several decades without observable negative consequence.
Consequences for Control. Because control was transferred question by question, no single question that was transformed into a censure episode shifted a significant amount of control to the coordinators. Instead, it was through the accumulation of these episodes that control of work practices transferred from the specialists to the coordinators, reconfiguring power relations in the organization. This process, at its death-by-a-thousand-cuts tempo, meant that it was difficult for the specialists to object to any one request by the managers, and its accumulated effects took time to be noticed and felt. The specialists did not simply consent and hand over responsibilities. Instead, they responded to specific breaches raised by the managers. As a result, the negotiation of control of laboratory compliance occurred for some time without its cumulative effect being realized.
The specialists wrote SOPs about hazardous waste, what could be poured down the drain, lab doors, emergency response, and 19 other issues. The coordinators, as shown in episode 1, were given common, actionable steps for determining what constituted hazardous waste and how to inspect its disposal. These documents were useful in that they identified which regulations applied, how to interpret them, and how the prescribed practice satisfied them. This removed the specialists' ability to exercise discretion or provide contingent advice. All labs were Question 22: How should we respond to unfamiliar smells? Specialists' advice: Researchers and coordinators are to page the specialists so they can attend to the situation, using their professional knowledge and experience to diagnose and solve the problem.
Identify
Researchers upset by specialists' response.
Researchers reported a strong, strange odor in a warm room. The lab members watched from the lab as three specialists investigated. What they saw baffled them. The coordinator explained, "They [the specialists] didn't bring any equipment. In fact, they opened the door and started wafting the odor into the hallway. They took out the sharps [needles] container and started wafting that."
The researchers observed that the specialists did not take precautions and had no obvious procedure. Instead, they seemed to take the counterintuitive action of releasing and spreading an unidentified odor: "They [the specialists] came, but didn't give us any advice."
Transform
Coordinators agree.
Coordinators discuss the researchers' account of the situation. They determine that the response represents a danger to the organization as a whole.
Construct
Coordinators describe and emphasize the specialists' inadequacy in autonomously handling a potentially high-risk situation.
Coordinator 3: "I had a response from EHS a couple of weeks ago that was not satisfactory.
[Researchers] noticed a strong chemical odor in a warm room that made their eyes water. They immediately shut the door and called us. We called the specialists. They're supposed to take care of these things. They came but made no suggestions. There was no follow-up."
EHS Manager: "Who came?" Coordinator 3: "[Names specialists]. They didn't bring any equipment I was really concerned. I would like to see some standard policy for incidents like this." EHS Manager: "We are suffering the growing pains of becoming a new organization."
Coordinator 1: "Actually, I have found the specialists to lack expertise."
Criticize
The manager draws on his detailed understanding of the response to probe the specialists on their response.
The manager immediately confronts the specialists and asks them to account for their approach.
Specialist 4: "When a lab calls about an air quality issue we go and collect an air sample. The air is collected by clipping a small air filter on one's collar that is attached to a battery pack that inhales the air through the filter and traps micro particles. We analyze the sample back at our lab." Specialist 7: "On the spot, if the lab can't give you a hint about the smell everything has to be considered-is there a truck parked by the air intake, is there construction or painting nearby, is the smell coming from the air vents. This type of situation requires general investigative skills-and someone with a good nose."
Compliance oversight transferred
Specialists spell out a new step-by-step procedure for responding to spills or releases in labs in which the specialists have a circumscribed role. After this list has been enumerated and after several rounds of comments, the work involved in responding to a release depends on project management skills and perhaps a consult from the specialists.
expected to comply with the practices identified in the SOPs and inspection guides. In addition to standardizing compliance advice and removing contingencies, some breaches led to changes in the specialists' advice (questions 12 and 16). In these two cases, not only was compliance oversight transferred but long-standing approaches used by the specialists were altered. Regarding question 16, a long-standing policy about lab door closures was overturned, and a detailed SOP described how the containment of biological waste could be managed without inconveniencing researchers through the imposition of too-stringent requirements. In the case of questions 2, 10, and 12, for example, a standardized checklist was produced that allowed the coordinators to oversee and manage compliance and response. These episodes led to the specialists explaining what they knew and did and to the coordinators questioning and influencing how compliance advice was articulated.
Despite their formal responsibility and expertise, the specialists were placed in a situation in which they had to explain and defend themselves. They were angered by this. A specialist complained that the coordinators have too much authority and say in what is happening like I said the squeaky wheel gets the grease they want things done their way. They want things to be easy for them. They want authority over us. But we are the experts in health and safety the coordinators go to the managers and complain about something and they say you are right and then we have to change what we are doing.
With time, the specialists' frustration grew, and they found the continuous discussion of their methods with respect to specific issues simultaneously tedious and threatening. During a staff meeting, the issue came to a head as the specialists tried to understand their relationship to the coordinators. A specialist explained that things had shifted so that "we've moved from working with them to working for them." They concurred that their relationship to the coordinators had become one of forced subservience, writing SOPs on each issue raised by the coordinators. Incrementally and cumulatively, the coordinators began to enact compliance responsibilities in the laboratory. Furthermore, the transfer of control question by question meant that the types of compliance responsibilities the coordinators controlled were not necessarily those reflected in the management system's design. Areas of compliance oversight, such as the disposal and storage of radioisotope waste, that were to be transferred to the coordinators remained the domain of the specialists. Other areas of compliance oversight that were not intended to be transferred to the coordinators, such as for lab-setupand-move work and spill-response work, became the coordinators' responsibility.
Censure Dropped
Not all questions went through all four phases of a censure episode. Questions 29-36 did not move from Phase 1 to Phase 2 because the specialists resolved questions in labs. For example, a researcher wondered why the lab did not receive regular reports on radiation exposure levels (question 35).
2 A specialist responded quickly to the researcher and coordinator, explaining in detail the step-by-step monitoring process used. The specialist made it clear that communication with the labs would occur only if a reading was abnormal. Was the question dropped because the responsibility was irregular and highly specialized? Question 29, which concerns an everyday issue, was also resolved locally, suggesting that the nature of the responsibility might not be relevant. In this situation, members of a biology lab were very angry because there was confusion about how to dispose of needles contaminated with radioisotopes. The researchers complained that the specialists gave contradictory advice on several occasions. The specialists responded immediately and retrained everyone. This question never reached the coordinator and so was also dropped.
The coordinators dropped questions 24-26 in Phase 2 because they found these to be truly local problemsissues for one lab or a small handful of labs. For example, for question 24, uncertainty about how to label and prepare autoclaved waste for collection, after a few weeks of poking around in labs, turned out to be confined to one or two. Even though practices differed across laboratories because labs used different disposal bags, the coordinators dropped the question. The coordinators dropped questions 27 and 28 in Phase 3. The issues were found to be organizational problems, but they could not be attributed to the specialists' practices. For example, question 27 concerned researchers' complaints about delays in approvals to work with particular biological materials and radioisotopes. The specialists confirmed the timeline but did not explain the details of the approval process. The coordinators' investigation revealed that delays were not the result of the specialists' practices but stemmed from the wait times imposed by external regulatory bodies. The coordinators did not attribute the problem to the specialists' practices and did not develop an account of a breach.
If the coordinators were struggling to control compliance in laboratories, why didn't all questions that reached the coordinators evolve into censure episodes? The researchers and coordinators were placated when the specialists' responses allowed them to point inspectors, lawyers, or department chairs to a reliable process or set of rules that the specialists had implemented and that did not burden or inconvenience researchers. Even if the coordinators did not understand all the details of the process or rules, they saw evidence of a systematic means of addressing compliance. Even though they would not oversee the responsibility (e.g., evaluate radiation exposure), they could confirm it had been done. They could articulate how they had fulfilled their responsibility to the labs and the university. The researchers' and coordinators' ultimate interest was maintaining laboratory compliance with minimal intrusion and irritation. Ironically, the specialists' responsibilities were not transferred to the coordinators when the specialists presented reasonable rules and made their work processes accessible.
The majority of the 13 questions in which censure did not occur related to the work of one specialist group, the health physicists. This group of specialists worked very differently than the other groups, not because of the nature of the materials or regulations but because they chose to devote much time to working with the labs on a regular basis (Huising 2014) . They addressed researchers' questions and complaints locally within the labs, and so the coordinators, busy dealing with the questions coming from labs, did not develop censure episodes in relation to the health physicists' work. In contrast, the biosafety specialists who emphasized the role of discretion, expertise, and opacity, preferring not to explain their work to laypersons, experienced the most censure episodes even though most of the original questions related to the environmental specialists.
Discussion
This paper considers the difficulties organizations face when they wish to claim control over the work of experts. Experts work in ways that cultivate their autonomy. They diagnose, infer, and treat cases, drawing on their expertise, in accordance with their own principles and standards. Organizations depend on these workers-on their knowledge, experience, and intuition-and it is difficult to disrupt this dependency and usurp control of their work. Others in the organization often do not understand what experts do and how they do it, and experts are unlikely to participate in efforts meant to change this. Furthermore, managerial requests can be ignored, and rewards and sanctions are unlikely to motivate. As a result, organizations rarely gain access to experts' practices, resorting instead to indirect means of control, influencing experts' disposition, commitments, and efforts.
In the case presented in this paper, planned attempts to transfer the work activities of specialists to others in the organization failed. For many months, the management system was an abstract design, a latent organizational chart, plans, goals, and a set of documents. The specialists coped with the challenges the management system presented to their control by ignoring it, passively resisting, and continuing to work as they always had. Little happened even as some aspects of the design materialized and two managers-close, formal authorities-were placed above the specialists. Neither their attempts at persuasion nor their commands affected power relations. Hiring the coordinators did not change anything quickly or automatically. For several months the coordinators struggled to enact their role without the help or consent of the specialists, who maintained entrenched dependencies and resources.
The researchers, coordinators, and managers could not individually or directly disrupt their dependence-the organization's dependence-on the specialists. I identify how, instead of trying to undo these dependencies, these actors developed an alternative means of wresting control from the specialists. By examining the grounds of the specialists' practices, these actors called into question the principles that underlay the specialists' practices and showed that they violated several goals of the new system. They did not raise these principles in general terms but instead developed episodes that in their detail and specificity denied the value and legitimacy of the specialists' practice by making skillful connections between a particular case and the general principles of discretion, prudence, and opacity. The coordinators, struggling to oversee compliance in laboratories, used the researchers' questions to argue that the specialists' practices created confusion, inconveniences, and uncertainties and that they contravened many of the management system's goals, including standardization and transparency. They questioned how, given these goals, customized advice, the requiring of compliance beyond regulatory requirements, and opaque practices could be condoned. They decreased the legitimacy of the specialists' practices by degrading the grounds for those practices. Managers leveraged these accusations, requiring that the specialists articulate, defend, and codify their practices and rationales.
At the same time that these actors together critiqued the specialists' practices, they produced a discussion about a new social order and showed how the specialists' practices contravened these ways of operating. New meanings of valid and legitimate bases of working reshaped entrenched dependencies and loosened the hold of established resource bases. By revising the priorities and goals that underpinned the desired social order, they opened relations to significant renegotiation. They used their time, effort, and limited resources to develop and impose a new framework of meaning about what constituted legitimate, valuable, useful compliance advice and practice. The researchers, coordinators, and managers mobilized the abstract model of the management system-in particular, the new structure of roles and responsibilities and the rationale for the system-in an attempt to redefine the values used to support and justify action. In doing so, they degraded and unsettled the terrain that the dominant group, the specialists, used to justify their control and prevent challenges.
The censure episodes depended on the introduction of three new roles (two management roles and the coordinator role) created as part of the management system. These roles, inserted above (managers) and lateral (the coordinators) to the specialists, had the potential to disrupt established dependences, generating new interdependencies, information flows, and formal, organizational locations from which challenge could occur, and bringing new expectations, interests, resources, and tactics to bear on the situation. Although the design of the management system did place pressure on the incumbents in each role, it did not offer an obvious or reliable set of tactics to respond to the pressure and fulfill these responsibilities. This collective means of renegotiating power relations was also not the result of an exacting calculation or strategic plan. It was developed blow-by-blow in relation to opportunities and based on whatever was at hand.
Each episode depended on this network of roles. It seems unlikely that any one set of actors, with their limited interests and resources, could have overcome the established dominance and resources of the specialists. The different interests, expectations, and resources of each role, together, pushed them to negotiate small and particular changes in control. Despite having a small role, the researchers' actions were crucial to the episodes. The management system placed some pressure on them to have a better understanding of compliance. Their complaints and questions about the specialists' compliance advice and practices fuelled the coordinators' work of constructing breaches and managers' work of denouncing practices. Each of these openings was exploited to create breaches, where possible. The intensity of the coordinators' effort was possible because there was ambiguity in the organization about what the coordinator role involved and how much authority the incumbents could wield. Although located in the management system design, the role did not have an established locus, either symbolically, physically, or hierarchically. This disadvantaged the coordinators because they lacked gravitas in relation to the specialists, but it also advantaged them by granting them autonomy and room to maneuver across the organization. The coordinators' performance within this ambiguous role was creative and agentic (Huising and Silbey 2011) . In addition to the tactics they developed, they demonstrated "a clever utilization of time, of the opportunities it presents and also of the play that it introduces into the foundations of power" (de Certeau 1984, p. 38) . This distinguished them from the specialists in terms of resources and responses. The specialists hoped their entrenched resources and lineage in the context-their formal place, established resources, and resulting dependencies-could withstand various pressures over time. They contributed to each episode by emphasizing and defending the features of the practices identified as the source of the breach.
The specialists failed to consider how negative or skeptical representations of their work practices might influence their control of these practices. They were largely unaware that their practices might be perceived as problems. Understandings of the legitimacy of expert practices often hinge on how experts perform their work (Anteby 2010) ; being able to claim control over a certain kind of work "is intertwined with how others view the work being performed" (p. 611). The breaches, although drawing on particular moments or concrete examples, focused on underlying principles of practice and denied the ongoing authority of the specialists in these moments by depicting the fallibility of their discretion, autonomy, and self-monitoring. The managers, ultimately responsible for implementation of the system, used these breaches to identify practices for change and to specify the nature of the change.
Contributions
This paper contributes to several scholarly conversations. First, the findings show how symbolic, collective efforts can upset the entrenched dominance of experts through the construction of new interpretations and perceptions of expert practices. Understanding the link between power and knowledge, managers often try to access and control the knowledge of experts as a means of disrupting their control. In contrast, discursive efforts disrupt the relationship between power and knowledge by questioning whether the knowledge is relevant. Because knowledge (or expertise) is power (or a resource), if the appropriateness of the knowledge is questioned, then power can be destabilized and possibly upended. Recasting established and dominant ways of work as illegitimate or harmful can be a subtle but alternative way of invoking or enforcing dormant goals and values.
Censure is accomplished by transforming the perceived character and value of expert practices or by rearticulating local values and goals in a way that devalues expert practices. In environments in which professional practices have an established, successful history, this censure will require that organizational goals be reformulated so that what once constituted a useful contribution to the organization now poses a threat. The likelihood that experts will defend the principles underlying their practices assists in articulating the reinterpretation. The reassessment of the meaning and significance of expert practices is more likely to succeed than direct attempts to establish control over expert processes, which may reinforce the perceived value of these resources for the organization.
Although abstract knowledge and opaque practices are important bases for control (Abbott 1991) , questions and uncertainties stemming from expert practices may be a source of weakness. By preventing questions or complaints related to their work from circulating in the organization and by maintaining positive representations of their work, professionals may be able to prevent managers from interfering in that work. Had the specialists paid closer attention to researchers' responses to their work, they might have been able to control representations of questions and uncertainties as problems. Because they did not notice or respond to questions about the discretionary nature of their advice, the overly demanding nature of their requirements, or the opacity of their responses, they lost the ability to control their work. Had the specialists engaged their audiences-the researchers and coordinators-to explain the legal and technical bases of their work and the rationales for their advice, they might have, ironically, been able to maintain control over this work. The experience of the health physicists who largely avoided censure by being open and available to the researchers and coordinators demonstrates this possibility.
Second, scholars who examine organizations as a terrain of continuously contested control (e.g., Alvesson and Kärreman 2004, Edwards 1979) often conceptualize struggles as dualistic, with managers attempting to wrest control and autonomy from employees (Fleming and Spicer 2008) . This line of study may be enhanced by considering how other interdependent groups of employees can influence these struggles. This paper recasts struggles for control in organizations as collective, distributed efforts. By examining organizations as pluralistic entities in which it is not simply managers versus workers but an ecology of groups with different worldviews and interests (Kaplan 2008 , Nigam et al. 2014 , Thomas 1994 , this paper qualifies assumptions of managerial power. Times of change become moments of uncertainty and opportunities for groups to advance their agendas and shape change to their advantage.
Specifically, this study demonstrates how new organizational roles and responsibilities, introduced as part of a planned-change initiative, offer a set of mechanisms that initiate, sustain, and link ongoing efforts to renegotiate power relations and control of domains of work and expertise. Eastern University's management system design continued to propel change despite initial, successful resistance. The three new roles-EHS manager, MS manager, and the coordinators-created a resilience and possibility for the continuance of the design. Despite the necessity of these roles, the mobilization of the actors in these roles and the coordination of the mobilization would likely not have been possible without the management system, which placed strenuous pressure on the roles and their respective interdependencies. Because the system was composed, in part, of new, interdependent roles invested with responsibility and local accountability, the incumbents in these roles became a source of activity that eventually brought the system to life (Cohen 2013) . The assigning of a responsibility to an individual, rather than the requiring of rule following, reflects an entrepreneurial approach to generate uncoerced action to fulfill responsibilities (Selznick 2002) . The roles and responsibilities designed into the management system created an intense force for change and a direction for that energy, significantly influencing the form of the emergent change. The detritus of planned changes offered resources as well as a set of forces and direction that may push emergent change onto a particular path.
Third, this paper develops a particular perspective on resistance found in social theory that shows that active, although not necessarily successful, counterresistance requires knowledge of the social structure and diagnosis of weaknesses in the structure (de Certeau 1984; Silbey 1998, 2003; Garfinkel 1964) . By examining vulnerabilities and potential breakdowns in daily practice, each censure episode showed how established patterns of activity are realized and repeated (Garfinkel 1964) . Furthermore, these accounts of everyday activities suggested how to effectively produce desired disturbances in these patterns (Ewick and Silbey 1998) . Because they reveal the opaque or taken-for-granted actions and interactions necessary to build products or produce services, breaches may generate new perspectives on the familiar and revised courses of action. This knowledge may be used to create opportunities for challenge or, as in this paper, to exploit opportunities for challenge (e.g., the researchers' questions).
This case of counterresistance that deviates from the increasing popular accounts of passive, individualistic, depoliticized means of coping in organizations Sewell 2002, Fleming and Spicer 2003) and revives the political nature of this concept by showing how resistance relies on an understanding of the power structure and use of the common pool of resources. Further, whereas material forms of resistance-strikes, sabotage, and picketing-are easier to observe, study, and write about, symbolic resistance may be more efficacious in relation to experts. Symbolic resistance requires that we look "in less obvious places to see practices of dissent" (Fleming and Sewell 2002, p. 857) . Although we know these processes are not deterministic and that there is potential for groups in dependent positions and with few established resources to challenge and win, we have limited evidence of how such challenges unfold. Analyses of these processes, such as this one, offer accounts of how groups who are in relations of dependence and with ineffective resources gather power.
Finally, by transposing the concept of degradation rituals to theorize the emergent change process at Eastern University, this paper extends and enriches the concept. Often degradation ceremonies involve spectacular breaches of the social-moral order-sexual deviance, criminal acts, or public hypocrisy-by high-status individuals. Such contraventions are not likely to be found at the daily, mundane surface of the organization. However, I show how degradation can occur through a series of smaller breaches and that together they can erode a group's legitimacy in an organization. Furthermore, degradation ceremonies often rely on a formal, institutionalized process (e.g., courts, regulations, procedures) to achieve a censure outcome. This paper shows how censure can be achieved through the repetition of a less formal and emergent process. Overall, the contribution to the degradation ritual literature is to demonstrate that this process may be operating on a smaller scale and through emergent processes to produce a similar outcome.
Boundary Conditions
Two characteristics of this empirical setting should be kept in mind when generalizing the findings of this study. Universities are professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg 1979) in which the autonomy and status of the academic, collegially governed side of the organization can apply pressure to the administrative, bureaucratically governed side. Similar to Levina and Orlikowski (2009) , I examine shifting power dynamics in a setting where the various actors are not related through a clear hierarchy (Evans 2011, Huising and Silbey 2013) . The specialists, reporting to the managers, reside on the administrative side of the organization. The push for a change in the specialists' practices was fuelled by pressure from the organization's academic side. The need to satisfy researchers and support the continued operation of the labs clearly influenced the attention that the coordinators and managers paid to researchers' questions and the lengths they went to in addressing them. Furthermore, the coordinators, although relatively low in the organizational hierarchy, had the support of the department chairs and dean. In other settings such as corporations, the absence of a high-status "client" such as the research labs and the more general pressure of the organization's academic side on the administrative side, may make it more difficult to build a successful censure campaign. However, in corporate environments, censure campaigns may be built drawing on pressure from external clients, customers, or suppliers.
Furthermore, the changes in control observed in this case depended on the repurposing of the rules, tools, and roles of a planned organizational change created by external shock. As discussed above, the censure episodes drew on both the scaffolding of the planned change and the ability to invoke external actors such as the EPA and auditors and a prior shock such as the inspection. More generally, this suggests that censure episodes require slack resources-actors with additional time to contribute to the censure process-a credible organizational goal that can be mobilized, and an audience that can be used to threaten action. This may not necessarily require an actual inspection or an external threat, but it does require the construction of one.
Conclusion
Organizations are contested terrain, as the struggle for control is continuous and advantages are often temporary (Edwards 1979 ). This paper examines the control paradox that organizations face in relation to the experts they employ. Close study of a control struggle between one organization and its experts shows how symbolic efforts in the form of censure episodes can erode experts' control of their work practices. This paper identifies and examines censure efforts as an indirect means to opening expert practices to evaluation, questioning, and eventual delegitimization within the organization. Note. R, researchers; C, coordinators; S, specialists; M, managers. 
